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This thesis, a historical case study, focuses on the conflict between Prussia
and Switzerland in the middle of the nineteenth century. Specifically, the thesis
examines the sources of the struggle, political developments during its course,
and the military measures taken by both sides, including the operational plans
for what might well have been a major war.
Through this conflict, one can observe that the Concert of Europe,
established after the defeat of Napoleon, was no longer functioning as it did in
1815 and immediately after. Since the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Neuchatel
was simultaneously a Prussian Principality and a Swiss canton.
In the face of Prussian efforts to resolve this ambiguity by force, the Swiss
presented a common front, setting aside the lingering divisions of the
Sonderbund War (the Swiss Civil War) from a few years before. In addition to
the fact that they were able to re-unite in the presence of a common foe, the Swiss
impressed the Great Powers with their determination to defend themselves. The
Swiss action during the Neuchatel Affair was arguably a major factor behind the
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis, a historical case study, focuses on a conflict that arose between
Prussia and Switzerland in the middle of the nineteenth century. It examines the
sources of the struggle, the political developments during its course, and the
military measures taken by both sides, including the operational plans for what
might well have become a major war.
In 1856-67, Switzerland and Prussia were on the verge of an armed
conflict. The ambiguous situation of Neuchatel, simultaneously a Swiss canton
and a Prussian Principality, was the cause of trouble. Two political systems
opposed each other: Swiss radicalism and Prussian monarchism. This
opposition came to a head within the microcosm of Neuchatel. In 1848 the
republicans seized power in the name of liberty and equality. Pro-Prussian
royalists led a coup in 1856, which failed lamentably. When the leaders were
taken prisoner; King Frederick William IV of Prussia called for their
unconditional release and for the re-establishment of his "legitimate rights over
the Principality." He tried to muster the support of the Concert of Europe to
reach a diplomatic solution to the conflict, for the most part without success.
The Great Powers, with the exception of Great Britain, disliked the Swiss
political system. Yet they all agreed that Prussia should not be allowed to
increase its power. The perpetual neutrality of Switzerland served the interests
of Europe—the important Swiss lines of communication were not in the hands of
a rival power. At the time, the Concert of Europe was not functioning as
smoothly as it had in 1815 and the period immediately afterward, owing to the
revival of traditional rivalries among France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia.
IX
Frederick William realized that no solution based on Great Power
consensus could be found, and decided to prepare for a military action. The
Swiss Federal Council, in turn, took several measures to face the Prussian threat.
General Guillaume-Henri Dufour was called upon to re-organize the armed
forces. Dufour was named Commander-in-Chief of the Swiss troops, thus
enjoying extended authority. Some 30,000 troops were mobilized and deployed
on the Rhine river, to support further mobilization if necessary. Dufour planned
to conduct an offensive in the area of Schaffhausen, linked to a strong defense in
Basel. This was the last war plan in Swiss history to preemptively engage
ground forces in large numbers beyond the national border.
In Prussia, three generals developed operational plans to attack
Switzerland: Prince Frederick Charles, General von Reyher, and General von der
Groeben. General von der Groeben's operational plan is the most impressive by
virtue of the secrecy surrounding it, the use of surprise at the operational level,
and the clearly defined objectives. Although it underestimated the role of terrain
and the will of Swiss resistance, its implementation would have tested the Swiss
defenses severely.
The affair did not end in bloody struggle, but in political compromise.
The Swiss government released its prisoners and the King of Prussia renounced
his rights on his "beloved principality." The long-term consequences were
favorable for the Swiss. Facing a common threat, they regained the unity that
had been seriously weakened some ten years earlier during the Sonderbund War
(1847). This resurgence of Swiss nationalism and patriotism in turn made a
lasting impression on the Great Powers, and certainly contributed to the
continued respect that Switzerland's neutrality enjoys to this day.
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In 1856-1857, Switzerland and Prussia were on the edge of an armed
conflict over Neuchatel, a Prussian principality and also a Swiss canton. This
ambiguous situation had existed since the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and
became critical in 1848. Two political systems opposed each other: Swiss
radicalism and Prussian monarchism. In the heart of Europe, Switzerland
enjoyed a special status of neutrality. The Great Powers recognized this
perpetual neutrality as a stability factor, neutralizing the important Swiss
lines of communication, in the best interest of Europe. No major power
should take advantage of the key passages. Thus conflict quickly exceeded a
regional aspect: the Concert of Europe felt concerned with a possible
enlargement of Prussian power. The international implications played a
major role in solving the conflict in a peaceful way.
On the national level, this struggle helped the Swiss to re-unify: having to
face a common adversary, the aftermath of the recent Sonderbund War 1
vanished. The Swiss unity and willingness to defend its national territory
demonstrated to Europe that Switzerland would not give in to foreign
pressures.
General Dufour's plans to defend the country outside of its borders are a
subject of major interest. Such an offensive posture is virtually unique in
In 1847 Switzerland was highly divided: politically, the industrialized cantons of the
central plain (Plateau) tried to reinforce the power of a central government and to let disappear
the differences between the cantons (money, postal services, internal customs, etc.) seeking by
this way to develop trade. The small cantons, which were all Catholic, were afraid to lose
their liberties and sovereignty. Religious divergences brought the country to war. General
Dufour, who was commanding the Federal Army (Protestant cantons) demonstrated, in addition
to his military skills, great respect for its adversaries and tried to avoid casualties and
damage. The war lasted for 25 days and cost less than 400 casualties for both sides. The new
Constitution of 1848 is a direct consequence of the war.
Switzerland's modern history. However, the planning was not the adequate
answer to the Prussian intentions.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT
The Neuchatel crisis of 1856-57 arose in part out of the aftermath of the
Revolutions of 1848. But it was also the culmination of a much longer
rivalry between France, Prussia and Switzerland for influence there.
A. HISTORY OF NEUCHATEL (1707-1848)
In 1707, Marie d'Orleans, Duchess of Nemours, Countess of Neuchatel,
last survivor of the House of Longueville, died without any direct heir.
Fifteen different pretenders formulated claims for the possession of
Neuchatel . Two major figures emerged among them: Francois-Louis de
Bourbon, Prince de Conti, supported by Louis XIV, and Frederick I, King of
Prussia. 2 Inevitably, the confrontation between these two powerful parties
should be considered more on a political than a legal level: the possession of
Neuchatel could facilitate military operations against the Franche Comte,
which was conquered by Louis XIV at the expense of the Habsburgs. Frederick
I spent more than 600,000 thalers to buy influence in Neuchatel. The best
positioned pretender was the Prince de Carignan Savoie: he renounced his
rights and was compensated with thirty-three thousand pounds by the King
of Prussia. In the end, the government in Neuchatel thought that the King
of Prussia would be the better choice, being powerful and not too close by. On
November 3, 1707, the government3 decided to select Frederick I as their
sovereign.
2
For more detailed information about the pretenders and the legal disputes between them, the
reader can consult Jacques Petitpierre, Neuchatel et la Confederation Suisse devant I'Europe.
Neuchatel: Editions H. Messeiller, 1958.
3
Called "les Trois-Etats."
The Swiss cantons did not react to this decision: they were divided about
the question. The Catholic cantons were not interested in the enlargement of
the Confederation with further Protestant elements and thus favored the
Catholic king of France. The Protestant cantons supported the Protestant
King of Prussia and were not especially interested in increasing the number of
French-speaking people. About this last statement—the language—all the
Swiss cantons agreed , independently of their religion.
Louis XIV reacted: he could not admit that Frederick I, a prince with
whom he was at war, was selected, thus winning a tactical advantage. He sent
troops to the border but in the end did not use them. He did not want to start
a conflict with part of the Swiss and was too preoccupied with other troubles
in the Flanders.
Thus Neuchatel's position in the eighteenth century is somewhat
ambiguous: politically belonging to Prussia, geographically located in
Switzerland, and more or less openly threatened by France. However, this
period can be characterized as peaceful, even if some republican ideas
developed, such as a consideration to join the Swiss Confederation; after 1789
the revolution in neighboring France brought a wind of independence.
In 1805, Napoleon planned the war against Austria and Russia. To keep
Prussia neutral he proposed to give up Hanover, which was a permanent
object of covetousness by the Berlin cabinet. In exchange, the King of Prussia
handed over the Principality of Neuchatel and the dukedom of Cleves to
France, and the marquisate of Ansbach to Bavaria.4 For many people in
Neuchatel , this voluntary alienation marked the end of the treaty of 1707.
The King of Prussia had renounced his rights forever.
4
Finally proposed at the Treaty of Schoenbrunn, signed on December 15, 1805, following the
victory of Austerlitz and the seizure of Vienna; confirmed at the Treaty of Paris, February 15,
1806.
In 1806, Napoleon gave up the Principality of Neuchatel to Marshal
Berthier, as "private property."
On December 23, 1813, Austrian troops began to occupy Neuchatel , which
in their view belonged to an allied prince of Napoleon.
In June 1814, the King of Prussia announced that he was going to take back
his rights over Neuchatel, achieving at the same time a "closer union to
Switzerland."5
The Congress of Vienna (1815) decided to give natural borders to the
Swiss. The Swiss government accepted Neuchatel as a new canton, at the
same time as the cantons of Valais and Geneva. However, the sovereignty of
the King of Prussia was maintained as specified in Article 23 of the final act of
June 3, 1815: "His Majesty, the King of Prussia ...his heirs and successors, will
possess, again as in the past, in total property following territories, ...the
Principality of Neuchatel together with the county of Valangin."
No mention of these rights figured in the treaty between Neuchatel and
the Swiss government. Thus the real problems began - the source of a
conflict between Switzerland and Prussia was created.
The people in Neuchatel were widely divided: the aristocratic families
expressed strong feelings for the royalist regime and Prussia, while the liberals
became more and more republican and Swiss, and wanted to be totally
detached from their bonds with Prussia.
As early as 1820, the government of Neuchatel was discussing a move to
buy back the Prussian rights.6 Opinions were still divided.
5
Memoire sur la question de Neuchatel 1856, N.p., n.d, pp. 28, 31.
Ch. Godefroid de Tribolet, Memoires sur Neuchatel
, p. 354, cited by Phillipe de Vargas,
L 'Affaire de Neuchatel 1856-1857. Le Negotiations diplomatiques . Lausanne: N.p, 1913.
On September 13, 1831, Lieutenant Bourquin, leading some three hundred
fifty armed men, seized the seat of the government, with the goal of ousting
the King of Prussia and installing a republican government. However, these
radical elements—or "patriots," as they called themselves—failed to organize
and thus allowed the government time to claim help from the Swiss
Government to maintain order. The Confederation sent emissaries to
negotiate with both sides, and troops to separate the adversaries. The
previous government took power again. When the federal troops left, after
two months of occupation, the government did not consult the people about
their future as promised, and persecuted the republicans. New attempts to
overthrow the government followed, all unsuccessful. As a consequence, the
positions hardened. Persecutions increased, and the government of
Neuchatel manifested a desire to break relations with the Confederation. On
August 28, 1833, the authorities refused to send the representatives "of the
Principality" to the assembly of the Swiss Confederation. The federal
authorities in turn threatened military occupation, and the representatives
duly arrived. The tensions continued in 1847, when the "Principality of
Neuchatel" refused to send its contingent under the federal command to fight
in the Sonderbund War. Neuchatel had to pay a fine of 300,000 francs for this
decision to flout the rules.
Within the population of Neuchatel, the different parties increasingly
radicalized their positions, until it led to a real revolution. In the name of
liberty and equality, the republicans seized the power on March 1, 1848, under
the command of Fritz Courvoisier and Ami Girard. Their goals were clearly
defined: a) to abolish the old regime; b) to institute the republic; c) to break the
personal union with the King of Prussia; d) to attach the canton solely to the
Swiss Confederation.7 The government was ill-prepared to defend itself and
fell without a single shot.
As the Swiss emissaries arrived in Neuchatel, they found a provisional
government already in place. "The Principality called you for help, the
Republic welcomes you" was the authorities' greeting.8 Since the Treaty of
1815 stipulated that the Confederation had to cooperate with the functioning
government, the Swiss did not envisage a military intervention as they did in
1831, in order to respect the conventions. Of course, they absolutely favored
the new government and its ideas. Von Sydow, Minister of the King of
Prussia, vehemently protested. Prussia did not appreciate the attitude of the
Swiss government, but it did not have the opportunity to react. As in France,
Austria and Italy, troubles broke out in Berlin. By March 18, the revolution
threatened the Prussian throne.
The provisory government in Neuchatel elaborated a new constitution.
The first article gave the general trend: "The canton of Neuchatel is a
democratic republic and constitutes one of the states of the Swiss
Confederation."9 On April 30, 1848, the people accepted the new constitution
with a vote of 5,813 in favor and 4,395 opposed. 10
7
Louis Edouard Roulet, "Aspects neuchatelois d'une contre-revolution," chapter in Les
Evenements de septembre 1856, Neuchatel: Imprimerie Centrale S.A., 1956, p. 5.
Q
Edgar Bonjour, Vorgeschichte des Neuenburger Konflikts, 1848-56, Berne: Bemer
Untersuchungen zur Allgemeinen Geschichte, 1932, p. 11.
9
Memoire sur la question de Neuchatel 1856, p. 47.
10
ibid.
B. POLITICAL EVENTS BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONS (1848-1856)
The Great Duchy of Baden, located on the borders with France and
Switzerland, was highly influenced by revolutionary ideas. The two revolts
of April and September 1848 were prepared by revolutionaries from Swiss
territory, with the support of some cantons. The government of Baden
mastered the situation with its armed forces. It generally condemned the
Swiss position. The defeated revolutionaries fled to Switzerland to seek
protection, which exacerbated the situation. The revolution started again in
1849, in southern Germany. The King of Prussia reacted by sending two army
corps led by his brother, Prince William. His idea consisted of reducing the
revolution in blood, which he did, and then of occupying Neuchatel to solve
this nagging problem once and for all. This was a good opportunity for the
radicals to unify the country. As they wrote in their press: "The whole
people burns to deal with the wild soldiery of the Prussian tyrant." 11
The tension increased as a Hessian company, with a strength of 170 men,
occupied the small enclave of Biisingen. 12 The Federal Council decided on
July 24, 1848 to increase the strength of the Gmur division to 8,000 men, and
to mobilize two other divisions of the same size. General Dufour was
nominated as the commanding general. The first division (Gmur) was
engaged on the border between Kreuzlingen and the mouth of the Aare river,
the third division (Bontems) in the west up to Basel. The second division (a
Bundi) was kept in the rear, as the army reserve. General Dufour thought
that the size of the reserve was too small to face a threat which could develop
11
Bonjour, Vorgeschichte des Neuenburger Konflikts, 1848-56, p. 41.
12
Biisingen is located north of the Rhine river, as are Schaffhausen and Ramsen.
very quickly; he organized two additional divisions,13 which should occupy
the areas between Lucerne and Zofingen, and between Solothurn and
Delemont. "Caution must anticipate events; to avoid being surprised it is
always good to think things through in advance." 14 He planned to mobilize
formations of the landwehr, if needed. Dufour's plan did not seek a decision
on the border, with long lines of defense. Its main idea was to concentrate on
the rear, to maximize the natural strength of the terrain. The ratio of reserves
versus engaged troops (3:2) is extremely high. The uncertainty of the
situation can explain this decision. A screen (the two divisions in front,
engaged on the border) allows him to detect the enemy intention and then to
concentrate with the main body to seek the decision.
Dufour clearly identified the problem of leadership: "...it would be
difficult to find officers to lead all this corps."15 The political situation
evolved positively: without foreign support, the King of Prussia renounced
his plan. The Hessian company, surrounded by two battalions, was disowned
and had to leave Swiss territory.
Between August 7 and November 22, the Federal Council successively
demobilized its troops. General Dufour was pleased to note that the Swiss
had reunited to face a common enemy. One battalion from Aargau was
stationed together with a company from Unterwalden in Mellingen: they
knew each other, because they were directly opposed in Gislikon during the








Dufour invited the artillery officers who led the fire against him at the same
battle. 16 Thus, he wrote in his diary that "The result of the campaign was
reconciliation, which meant a lot."
The crisis started again in 1849, however, with a new insurrection in
Baden and a new engagement of Prussian formations: the problem between
Switzerland and Prussia was not resolved.
The Swiss Government decided on June 15, 1849 to mobilize one brigade
in Basel, under the command of Colonel Kurz. When the threat did not
subside, a second brigade, under the command of Colonel Miiller, prepared
the defense of the canton of Schaffhausen on July 3. The revolutionaries
from Baden were severely defeated by the Prussian army. They sought refuge
in Switzerland, which allowed them to cross the border, with 10,000 men and
60 guns. They were disarmed and interned.
The exasperated King of Prussia sought support from the Great Powers.
France should allow the use of its territory for Prussian operations against
Neuchatel. One need only recall the close relationship of the "Prince-
President" Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte 17 with Switzerland to understand that
this approach had little chance of success. In addition, the Concert of Europe
did not favor a war in the middle of Europe, even to crush Swiss radicalism.
England was one of the main supporters of the Swiss policy, taking care of the
actual balance of power on the continent. Frederick William IV renounced
the use of force to re-institute his power in Neuchatel. His new attempt
These two events are cited by Edouard Chapuisat in Le General Dufour, 1787,-1875,
Lausanne: Payot, 1935, pp. 164-165.
17
Louis-Napoleon grew up in Arenenberg, on the Swiss side of Lake Constance. As a Swiss
citizen, he went to the officer school in Thun, where he was a student of a certain Captain
Dufour, the future general. A close friendship developed between the two men, which lasted
through the years. Dufour was the confidante and, if requested, always gave advice.
10
concentrated on the diplomatic level. He considered that the Neuchatel affair
was a question of principle, concerning every sovereign in Europe: "The
insignificance of the object should not overshadow the greatness of the
principles." 18 Neuchatel was a republic created by a revolution and it should
be of a common interest to re-establish the rule of "divine right." Thus
Frederick William IV's emissaries tried to obtain support for a kind of
crusade against Swiss radicalism.
Von Sydow proposed that Tsar Nicholas I should organize a conference
with the Great Powers. Thus everyone could acknowledge that questions of
principle were dominating the debate. Tsar Nicholas was known to be very
conservative; yet, he declined, not being interested in defending what he
considered private interests.
Austria and France were reluctant to support Prussia's views. In England,
Bunsen, the Prussian emissary, was received by Palmerston, the foreign
minister. After having guaranteed that the King of Prussia was renouncing a
restoration in Neuchatel for the present, he got a note which recognized the
rights of Frederick William to Neuchatel. However, the British Government
"...would be very happy ...to help to find a friendly solution to this conflict."19
The King of Prussia pursued his efforts. He thought that he had succeeded
as on May 24, 1852, the five Great Powers signed the Protocol of London. His
rights to Neuchatel were clearly recognized. However, he renounced taking
any initiative as long as other Great Powers were trying to negotiate. This
political result was in fact of little interest for Frederick William: he had tied
18
Bonjour, "L'affaire de Neuchatel sur le plan european," chapter in Les Evenements de
septembre 1856, p. 128.
19
Papers preserved at the British Record Office, 1856.
11
his hands. The Great Powers, especially England and France, always found
good reasons not to undertake negotiations, which were always at an
"inappropriate time."
For Switzerland, the Protocol of London did not have great importance.
However, for the first time, Napoleon recognized Prussia's rights. It was
essential to him to reintegrate the conference of the Great Powers since his
coup. He knew that the other powers were afraid of a French Republic
contesting the conditions made in 1815. Thus, everyone enjoyed seeing the
Concert of Europe working again.
In Neuchatel, the royalist party still thought that Prussia would intervene.
It did not register popular support. On March 28, 1852, the royalists got 14
deputies elected, against 74 for the republicans. However, one should be
careful with these numbers; many royalists did not accept the republican rules
and did not vote.
The royalists had little confidence in the Protocol of London. They
organized secret meetings, as the "black cabinet," to prepare the counter-
revolution. They tried to find out if the king would directly support them in
an armed coup. A clear answer was difficult to obtain. Thus the conspirators
thought that the king did not intend to order such a coup, but that, once
started, he would tolerate and support it.
Von Sydow reassured the royalists: the Restoration would definitely take
place. It was just a question of time. Thus they had to support the existing
conditions and trust their sovereign.
Frederick William hardly tried to bring the Great Powers to discuss the
question of Neuchatel again. His last attempt was made in Paris at the
beginning of 1856, when the peace ending the war in Crimea was debated. As
on former occasions, his request was not taken into consideration.
12
In August 1856, Colonel Frederick de Pourtales, one of the moderate
royalist leaders in Neuchatel, went to Berlin to meet with the Prince,
Manteuffel, the President of the Council of Ministers, and General Gerlach.
In fact, he did not get clear answers from the divided Prussian Government.
However, he understood an ambiguous statement that the king had decided
to "...do what his honor commands" as an encouragement to the counter-
revolution. Pourtales declared that "He now knows what he has to do,"20
and went back to Neuchatel.
Considering the failures of the diplomatic approach, a coup using force
was for the royalists the only remaining option. Colonel de Pourtales and
Colonel de Meuron were designated as the military leaders. They now had to
prepare their troops to restore the king's authority over his "faithful
Principality." George-Frederick Petitpierre, Count of Wesdehlen, was the
political leader of the insurrectionist movement.
20
Bonjour, Vorgeschichte des Nenenburger Konflikts, 1848-56, p. 96.
13
14
III. THE 1856 COUP, THE RESOLUTION OF THE NEUCHATEL AFFAIR
(1856-1857)
A. THE COUP
Colonel de Pourtales wrote his first order on August 29, 1856. It stipulates:
The movement is to be conducted during the night, between September 2
and 3. It will be simultaneously carried out in Neuchatel and in the
mountains.21 The royalists of Neuchatel will get specific orders. By the
present order, the royalists of the mountains will have to rise en masse.
The royal authority will be simultaneously proclaimed in La Sagne, Le
Locle, La Brevine and in the neighboring communities. Meeting points
will be designated ad laler. (Signed: The Commander in Chief in the
name of the king, in its Principality of Neuchatel and Valangin. Pourtales,
Colonel.)22
Thus during the night between September 2 and 3, 1856, the two actions
took place. Colonel Pourtales, leading some four hundred men, seized the
City of Le Locle at 0215. At 0300, Colonel de Meuron attacked the castle in
Neuchatel with about a hundred men, and seized it. They immediately
started to reinforce it, in preparation for counterattacks. In the city of
Neuchatel , the royalists arrested some leaders of the republicans, with little
success: some were on leave or had managed to escape. On September 3 at
0800, the following declaration was posted in Neuchatel: "Long live the king!
The king's flag flies again over our prince's castle. People of Neuchatel,
thank God! Faithful [people] [come] to me! (Signed: de Meuron)."23 During
21
The part of the Jura belonging to Neuchatel is called "the mountains" by the inhabitants of
the canton. Strong rivalries (economic and political) opposed and still oppose people living in
"the mountains" with the one of the coast of the lake.
22
Rapport du Conseil d'Etat au Grand-Conseil de la Republique et canton de Neuchatel sur
Vinsurrection royaliste du 3 septembre. Neuchatel: Imprimerie de Charles Leidecker et A.




the daytime of September 3, the republicans realized what had happened,
reorganized and mobilized their forces. Several skirmishes occurred. Major
Girard, leading republican troops, hindered the royalists from seizing la
Chaux-de-Fouds and ejected them from Le Locle. At 1800, the Vice President
of the Confederation, Fornerod, accompanied by Frey-Herosee, another
federal councilor, arrived in Neuchatel "...to re-establish the constitutional
government and to prevent a bloody confrontation between the parties;
military strength will be ordered to their disposition."24
Under the leadership of Colonel Denzler, the republican troops attacked
the castle in the first hours of September 4. After a short fight, the royalist
leaders tried to escape and their troops surrendered. The casualties were
relatively low: eight dead and 26 wounded. The number of prisoners varies
among the sources and the literature. The official report of the government
mentions 530 of them (482 coming from the canton of Neuchatel). One could
imagine that some additional prisoners were quickly released.25 The exact
number is not important. The fact that they were captured by the republicans
in the name of the legally elected government of Neuchatel, and not by the
federal troops, which would have involved the Swiss Confederation,
constitutes a determining factor. It was important that the problem could be
solved internally. The argument used in 1848 that the Confederation had to
deal with the installed authorities in Neuchatel was thus maintained. A
military intervention against the royalist party could have been interpreted as
a "foreign" interference in local affairs. Effectively the four battalions sent by
24
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the Confederation arrived in Neuchatel at 1800 on the same day, as the
Neuchatel Government was absolutely mastering the situation.
A federal examining magistrate, Duplan-Veillon, started his inquiry and
on September 23, the majority of the prisoners were released. Seventy were
prosecuted, and among them fourteen, the leaders, were sitting in jail. The
general public prosecutor of the Confederation proposed that the accused
leaders be charged with high treason and attack against the State's security.
The trial was planned to take place in Neuchatel on January 3, 1857.
Of course, King Frederick William IV reacted: he could not admit that his
faithful supporters were jailed and faced a trial. He ordered his ambassador,
Von Sydow, to require the Confederation to release the prisoners without any
condition and to re-establish his rights. Von Sydow should threaten to use
force to impose the king's will. Jacob Stampfli, President of the Swiss
Confederation, rejected the demand: he was ready to negotiate the fate of the
royalists, but only after a renunciation of Prussia's claim to the "Principality."
B. THE NEUCHATEL AFFAIR AS A EUROPEAN PROBLEM
Frederick William developed intensive political activity in order to get the
support of the European powers. The Neuchatel affair preoccupied the
European governments essentially for two reasons: first, this friction occurred
just after the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Great Powers were interested
in maintaining the peace that had just been re-established. Second, they were
afraid of new revolutions. After having been crushed, the defeated
revolutionary movements had regained their strength and were observing
the radical Swiss Government challenging a monarchy with greatest interest.
President Stampfli did not play this card: he did not want to internationalize
the conflict.
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The Swiss authorities thought they could rely on Louis-Napoleon,
Emperor of the French people, who had declared: "As long as I will be alive,
Switzerland can rely on me; I will always consider the Swiss territory as sacred
as the French one."26 The Emperor certainly did not want to consider having
Prussian troops on France's border; however, he was interested in gaining
Prussia's support in Italy, where he favored the independence movement
against Austria. In addition, he was pleased to play the role of arbiter in
European affairs. On October 24, 1856, he wrote a letter to General Dufour
proposing to "...set free the prisoners on my formal request."27 After this
gesture of goodwill, he thought that the affair would find a natural solution.
On the other hand, Napoleon in was threatening that, if the Federal Council
did not accept his proposition, "...he would put no obstacle to the
concentration of a Prussian army in the Grand Duchy of Baden."28 The
Federal Council received the letter and decided to take advantage of Dufour's
friendship with the Emperor and sent him to Paris. On November 13,
Dufour met Napoleon III and discussed the situation for three hours: first, the
prisoners had to be released and after that, the emperor would organize a
conference and convince the King of Prussia to renounce his rights. Dufour
met Lord Cowley, British ambassador, who encouraged the discharge of the
prisoners, without giving further promises. Count Walewski, the French
26
Bonjour, Les Evenements de septembre 1856, p. 131.
27
Guillaume-Henri Dufour, Campagne du Sonderbund et evenements de 1856, Neuchatel:




foreign minister,29 nevertheless felt there was "...a moral certainty of success
in Berlin."30
The Federal Council was not convinced by the French arguments. It
lacked serious guarantees. Thus, it rejected Napoleon Ill's proposition.
Dufour's diplomatic mission to Paris had failed.
The tension grew very quickly. The Minister President of Prussia, von
Manteuffel, directly threatened:
If the diplomatic efforts in Bern do not succeed, the Berlin cabinet intends
to move three army corps to the Swiss border and to seize Schaffhausen as
a guarantee. The expedition's costs would be charged to Switzerland.31
The hard line of the Federal Council did not vary. Thus, on December 13,
Prussia broke diplomatic relations with the Confederation, announcing a
mobilization of some 150,000 men on January 2, 1857, and that the king
would personally lead the troops.
Frederick William intensified the diplomatic discussions with the
European powers in order to get support for his military plans. He was
surprised by the French reaction allowing the use of force. However, as
Napoleon in considered the Swiss mobilization and their strong willingness
to fight, he discouraged the King of Prussia from mobilizing (December 23
and 26) before all diplomatic efforts were made. Thus France went back to its
prior position.
Russia theoretically supported Prussia: Tsar Alexander II had appreciated
Prussia's neutrality during the Crimean War, and thus exerted moderate
29
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pressure on the Swiss government. At the same time, he recognized the
dangerous consequences to which a war in central Europe could lead.
Frederick William was certain that he could rely on Emperor Franz
Joseph, who shared his views on Swiss radicalism. Did they not wish some
few years earlier to re-establish the old order in Switzerland, taking back
Neuchatel for Prussia, giving Geneva to France and Ticino to Austria? This
unrealistic plan was strongly condemned by England at that time.32 Ticino
basically presented a problem for Austria; for some ten years, this canton was
the refuge for Italian patriots and revolutionaries. The Swiss asylum
exasperated the Austrian authorities, especially, for instance, in February 1853,
when a revolution took place in Milan, organized by people protected by the
Swiss border. Napoleon defended Swiss neutrality and interests. Without
his intervention, a conflict would have arisen between Austria and
Switzerland. However, one should not overestimate the threat coming from
Ticino. France and Sardinia represented other dangers to Austrian stability
on northern Italy. Edwin von Manteuffel presented his king's plan: Austria
should support the military operations with armed forces invading a part of
Switzerland. In return Prussia would send the same strength to support
Austria in northern Italy, when needed. Franz Joseph was realistic enough to
consider the peace in this area a vital interest. In addition, he disliked the
thought of increasing Prussian influence in Austria, and was highly
distrustful of any reconciliation between Prussia and France. Buol, the
President of the Cabinet in Vienna, used all means possible to disconnect
Paris from Berlin. The passive Austrian official position—to take no special
measure—disappointed Frederick William: he felt that the Protocol of
32
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London should be strictly respected, and that diplomatic efforts would be
undertaken to invite the Federal Council to release the prisoners. In addition
to this peaceful position, Austria directly encouraged the southern states of
Germany to deny the right of passage across their territory to Prussian armed
forces. Thus, the rivalries between Prussia and Austria weighed against the
recovery of Frederick William's "dear Principality of Neuchatel."
England and Switzerland had good relations. They shared common
liberal conceptions. England was preoccupied with maintaining peace on the
continent, which would allow a harmonious development of trade. Thus,
from the beginning, Palmerston and the British cabinet firmly supported the
cause of the Swiss government. When Frederick William wrote to Queen
Victoria, he got a flat refusal of any help, even though his rights were
recognized. The Protocol of London was mentioned as something to be
respected. Furthermore, the Treaty of 1815 did not allow Prussia to intervene:
"Prussia was a party to all the arrangements of 1815, by which the neutrality,
independence, and inviolability of Switzerland are placed under the
guarantee of all the Powers which were parties to the Treaties of the year."33
The British disliked the fact that Prussia was trying "...to prevent an
independent State from bringing to trial persons who have committed acts
against a de facto Government, which in every country of the world would be
deemed a violation of the social compact."34 England reinforced its position
with stronger notes transmitted just before the Prussian mobilization.
However, England would certainly not have gone to war to protect
33




Switzerland. Facing the Concert of Europe, Prussia was thus isolated with its
war plans.
The attitudes of the German states, lying geographically between the two
opponents, were of course important factors with respect to military
movements. Bavaria supported Prussia: it was time for Switzerland to learn
how order should work in Europe. Baron v.d. Pfordten, Minister President,
defended the monarchical principles. It was for him a favorable course of
action to exploit the Neuchatel affair to "...cut off forever the head of the
revolutionary hydra in Europe."35 However, Bavaria was not ready to do
more than allow Prussian troops to move through its territory. This
authorization was officially given on January 6, 1857, by King Maximillian II.
A military operation against Switzerland would have had important
consequences for Baden, a direct neighbor: not only would Prussian armed
forces cross its territory, but they would also use it as a base of operations. For
this reason, Baden risked Swiss retaliation if it took an active part in the
conflict. Von Meysenburg, the Minister President, took some preventative
measures to protect Constance and other important locations. He tried to get
more information from the Prussian cabinet, without any success. Grand
Duke Frederick I favored involving his troops, and hoped to seize
Schaffhausen for his own benefit. The government, however, was reluctant
to intervene in the conflict for internal political reasons: it feared that
democratic movements could take advantage of the situation to start a new
revolution. Facing such uncertainties, the duchy opted for a cautious
neutrality. The regiment in Constance withdrew on December 23: the signal




In Wiirttemberg, King William I gave total support to his "cousin."
However, diverging opinions arose. Public opinion and the newspapers
considered Switzerland "...peaceful, inoffensive and the best neighbor of
Germany."36 Prussian militarism was highly criticized. A group of liberal
representatives wrote a request to refuse passage to Prussian forces. Thus,
despite the king's support, Wiirttemberg was opposed to foreign forces
moving through its territory. Prussia could have forced them, but resistance
could have been expected. Possible guerrilla warfare could have created
major difficulties for both kings.
The attitude of the North German states was different: they unanimously
condemned Switzerland. However, the general public opinion was that of
reservation, as opposed to the noble leaders. The great Duke of Hesse
declared:
The day when the Prussian forces would march past would be a true feast
for [me]. The army should penetrate into Swiss territory deeply to seize
the mountain passes. [I] hope that this opportunity to remove the Swiss
right of asylum should not be wasted; the radical actions should no longer
be tolerated.37
Prussia persuaded the German Federation to blockade Switzerland. Thus
the border was closed with Bavaria, but not with Baden or Wiirttemberg,
which continued to export grain and horses. Even the embargo on weapons
was not respected: the rifle factory in Altendorf (Wiirttemberg) was working
day and night to produce weapons for the Confederation. Such a blockade did
not make great sense, as Switzerland could continue to trade with other
neighbors, especially Austria and Sardinia.
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The diplomatic network of the Swiss Confederation was relatively thin:
ambassadors were to be found in Vienna and Leipzig, but no one was
assigned to Berlin. Thus the Swiss interests were not defended at Frederick
William's court, at least not officially. Some private initiatives were taken to
convince the king to renounce a military operation. Theodore S. Fay,
Minister of the United States in Bern, and Heinrich Gelzer-Sarasin, a history
professor from Basel, made the trip to Berlin to meet the king. The Federal
Council sent emissaries to its neighbors in southern Germany to make clear
that they should not collaborate with the Prussian army.
It is difficult to know what the Swiss people thought about a possible war
with Prussia. The newspapers described a strong patriotic elan, supporting
the firm line of the government; diplomats in Bern mentioned the
aggressiveness and willingness to defeat the Prussian army. The Duke of
Saxen-Coburg-Gotha wrote that the Prussian policy "generated the warlike
spirit of the old Confederation in such a way that the European powers were
afraid." Henri-Frederic Amiel composed a special song for the troops engaged
on the Rhine river, with telling words: "In our cantons, every child is born a
soldier," "Switzerland always saw heroes, never slaves...." More significant
are the facts that there were no difficulties in mobilizing the troops; the
canton Vaud offered twenty-five battalions instead of the nine requested.
Volunteers came from all over the country. Student societies, like Zofingen
in Geneva, formed a corps.38
Some opposition to the government's inflexibility appeared in the
National Council. Representatives thought that concessions should be made
and suggested establishing new contacts with Napoleon. General Dufour was
38
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not able to leave for Paris; he was leading the Swiss army. Thus the Federal
Council designated Dr. Kern to go to Paris where he met Barman, the Swiss
Ambassador to France. Napoleon III could persuade Frederick William to
postpone the mobilization from January 2 to January 15. The French
Emperor showed personal letters from the King of Prussia, which suggested
that he would renounce his rights if the prisoners were released and given
amnesty. In fact, the French position did not vary, compared with the
propositions Dufour brought back to Bern some weeks earlier. The Federal
Assembly voted and accepted the solution of offering amnesty to the
prisoners and to banish them until the King of Prussia definitively gave up
his rights to Neuchatel. During the night of January 17, the prisoners were
brought to the border in Les Verrieres. They engaged themselves not to come
back to Switzerland before the end of the negotiations and left to Pontarlier.
The decision to release the prisoners raised criticism. Some people argued
that the government exchanged real traitors, who were not even judged,
against a vague promise concerning rights which did not exist. For the first
time during this period of tensions, a division occurred among the different
parts of the country. The French-speaking part, regardless of the political
parties, did not understand "the cowardly giving up." The newspapers
severely criticized the decision of the Federal Assembly and presented the war
as the solution to the problem. "We are all ready and we are strong enough
to measure ourselves [with Prussia]."39 "Diplomacy should settle the matter;
if it cannot, let the powder spark."40 There was mention of treason by "our
Germans."
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In fact, it would have been very delicate to bring the "revolutionaries"
before a court, as those of 1848 were never prosecuted and the prisoners'
release meant an attempt to avoid armed conflict.
To the Prussian public, the decision of the Swiss Government was
considered a victory. The king was thought to be able to exert some pressure
during the negotiations.
C THE END OF THE CRISIS
A direct agreement between Switzerland and Prussia was impossible.
England, however, convinced France to organize a peace conference in Paris
attended by both belligerents, as well as by Austria and Russia. The
negotiations were difficult: the radicalism of the Swiss was rejected by all the
Powers, except Britain. Nevertheless, the British representative Cowley took
an increasing role and convinced the other powers to support Switzerland.
Frederick William presented the following claims:
1. The title "Prince of Neuchatel and Valangin" should be
maintained forever by the King of Prussia.
2. The costs for the Swiss mobilization should not be charged to the
royalists in Neuchatel .
3. The amnesty for the former prisoners should be extensively
assured.
4. The King of Prussia should get a compensation of two million.
5. The properties of the Church and of the State should be separated
in the canton of Neuchatel .
6. The religious charitable organizations should be assured.
7. The Constitution of Neuchatel should be re-voted only by
people born as citizens of Neuchatel.
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After four sessions, the Federal Council gave directives to Dr. Kern to
defend the following positions:
1. Switzerland could not forbid the existence of the title; however,
no claim should be made by the king based upon this title.
2. Agreed.
3. Agreed.
4. Refused: protest against any compensation.
5. Refused: no interference in cantonal decisions.
6. Agreed: however, without any intervention by a foreign state.
7. Refused: it was not possible to admit a violation of the Federal
Constitution.
Prussia protested but finally agreed. During the eighth session, on May 26,
all the parties signed a treaty containing eight articles:41
Art. 1. "His Majesty the King of Prussia agrees to renounce his
rights forever... on the Principality of Neuchatel."
Art. 2. "The State of Neuchatel . . . will belong to the Swiss
Confederation...."
Art. 3. "The Swiss Confederation takes all the costs resulting from
the events of September 1856 to its charge. The canton of Neuchatel
will not be charged, proportionally, more than another canton..."
Art. 4. "The costs charged to Neuchatel will be equally shared by all
the inhabitants..."
Art. 5. "A full and entire amnesty will be guaranteed for all
offenses..."
Art. 6. "The properties of the Church, unified to the State in 1848,
41
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will not be diverted from their prior destination."
Art. 7. "The capital and income of religious institutions, of private
institutions . . . will be respected ..."
Art. 8. "The present treaty will be ratified ... "
The treaty was signed by Walewski (France), Hiibner (Austria), Cowley
(England), Hatzfeldt (Prussia), Kisseleff (Russia), and Kern (Switzerland) and
ratified on June 16, 1857. The conflict was over with two major positive
factors for Switzerland. First, the internal divisions resulting from the
Sonderbund War were erased. Second, the determination to defend the
country at any cost left a good impression on the Great Powers. Switzerland's
willingness to protect its neutrality and to defend its interests were thereafter
taken into account by the rest of Europe. This attitude may have helped to
preserve Swiss neutrality and peace in the future. For the Concert of Europe,
finally the treaty of Paris marked a success: the "status quo" was maintained,
war was avoided in the heart of Europe, and the monarchies remained in
power.
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IV. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SWITZERLAND AND THE MILITARY
MEASURES TAKEN
A. SITUATION OF THE SWISS ARMED FORCES
The most recent military reorganization prior to the struggle with Prussia
took place in Switzerland in 1850, as one of the consequences of the
Sonderbund War. Thereafter, the Confederation started to play a more
important role in the military organization and education, although still
limited in comparison with the great reforms that took place in the 1870s.
Centralization was progressing but incomplete; the cantons were still
responsible for the education of the infantry formations, while the
Confederation trained the specialists (engineers' corps, artillery, cavalry,
guides for exploration purposes, logistics formations, snipers).
Every Swiss male had to serve in the armed forces. Those who were not
able to carry out military duty were required to pay a special tax. This system
is still in effect today.
The duration of basic training school was 42 days for specialized troops in
federal camps, 28 days for the infantry. Refresher courses of one week were
organized every year for the main body. Engineers' corps and artillery
constituted an exception, serving (for two weeks) every two years.
These periods of military education were short compared to the
professional armies of the time. In cases of crisis, the mobilization was
supposed to be ordered early enough to allow further improvement of
military skills. 42 In addition to the weakness of short training periods,
smaller units were not accustomed to collaborate with each other: the notion
42
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of "combined arms" did not exist. The troops of the so-called "elite"43 used
to train at least on the half-battalion level for three days every year, or for six
days every two years. The reserve trained the same way, but for reduced
periods (two to four days), while the "landwehr" trained only for one day.
Even if the Prussian troops were not organized by von Roon, they would
probably have had an advantage in pure military education about the Swiss
formations. However, one should take other factors into consideration in
comparing the two parties. These aspects will be treated later in the present
paper.
The strength of the "elite" formations was as high as 70,000 men (serving
from the age of 20 until 34), and the federal reserve had 35,000 men (serving
from age 35 to 40). The rest of the male population was incorporated into the
"landwehr." The following units constituted the "elite" and the federal
reserve:44
- infantry: 105 battalions
20 half battalions
22 independent companies
- engineers' corps: 12 sapper companies
6 pontonier companies
- artillery 63 companies (with a total of 600
guns)
- logistics formations45 12 companies
43
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- cavalry 35 companies
- guides 7 and 9 half-companies
- snipers 71 companies
Brigades and divisions were to be organized for specific missions. Thus,
every division could be different in size and composition. During peacetime,
the division commanders were not designated, and no planning staff existed
at this level. It appears to be a weakness, not having had commanders
preparing engagements, influencing the education and creating an "esprit de
corps" for their divisions. This kind of flexibility cannot compensate for the
resulting lack of readiness.
B. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF SWISS STRATEGIC THINKING
General Dufour exerted a great influence on the ideas of the Swiss military
intelligentsia. His military background46 determined his strategic reflections.
His model was definitely Napoleonic. It is interesting to note his disinterest
for Jomini's work: he never pardoned the "treason committed against the
emperor." In Dufour's bookcases, no major book written in German could be
found. Thus, several analysts argue that Dufour even ignored the theories
developed by Carl von Clausewitz.
On the political level, the government adopted a strict neutrality. The
question of looking for allies to support military actions was not taken into
46
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Engineering Staff.
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consideration. This was true in part because Switzerland was a special case in
the heart of Europe, an isolated democracy in the middle of countries ruled by
monarchic systems. This perception of strict independence was shared by the
military leaders, as Dufour said in front of the officers in Geneva:47 "In every
case, one should just rely on himself to repel an invasion."
The defense was considered to be the most successful way to deal with an
adversary, by taking advantage of the strength of the terrain, which was
increased by the extensive use of fortifications. However, an offensive
component was also necessary to reach the decision, to destroy the enemy.
Thus, the leading idea was to conduct a defense with offensive elements. The
desire to take advantage of internal lines made mobility essential. Basically,
the front elements were to separate and to canalize the opposite forces. Then
the maneuver elements were to attack isolated columns and destroy them
before enemy reserves were able to intervene. Concentration of forces and
local superiority were paramount. Thereafter, another isolated formation
could be attacked in succession. However, experience demonstrates that to
plan such successive attacks is not realistic: losses, time to reorganize, and
time to move tend to make several successive attacks by reserves or mobile
forces uncertain and risky.
It is interesting to note that no concrete plans were available on the eve of
the 1856 events. The officers of the federal general staff were busy with the
tremendous task of accumulating the data to produce the new Swiss maps,
called the Dufour-map, which still constitutes the foundation of the federal
topography.48
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Nevertheless, Dufour carried out some strategic analysis during the period
between the Sonderbund War and the crisis with Prussia. In particular, he
defined the area where the decision had to be made:
The great lozenge formed by the water course of the Aare, the Limmar and
the line following the foot of the Alps from Weesen to Thun, passing by
Schwyz and Stans, is of great military value. All the interior defense has
to concentrate in this lozenge. It is like a vast entrenched camp for the
federal army. It is possible to dispute ground outside of the perimeter;
however, it is inside of it that the main battle, which will determine our
fate, should happen.49 /50
Dufour determined forward bastions where "...divisions in charge of their
defense will dispute them relentlessly."51 One should not imagine that each
striped area (see note 50) would be simultaneously defended by a division:
the strength of the Swiss armed forces would not have been sufficient to
implement such a plan, while conducting a main effort in the central zone.
The occupation of these sectors would have been ordered in response to
possible threats. Estimating the political situation in Europe in the 19th
century, a simultaneous threat coming from each direction was unlikely.
Considering Dufour's strategic ideas, some points should be emphasized.
First, offensive actions were planned across the border: initiative was
intended to bring success. These offensive actions would take place in the
proximity of Schaffhausen (on the Aach and Wutach rivers, as later
elaborated for the 1856-57 campaign), in the Rhine Plain (to block the main
access coming from Austria), and on the Arlbergpass. As Dufour wrote, the
civilization of the country. Its accuracy is very high: the biggest error on the line joining up
with Italy does not exceed 65 centimeters. The completion of the map cost more than one
million francs to the Confederation and took more than twenty years.
49
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possession of this pass "...would be of the highest importance, if we have to
act offensively in this direction."52 This offensive posture is especially
interesting in relation to neutrality. After this period, no offensive action was
planned across the border, without having an enemy on Swiss territory. The
adversary would have to cross the border first.
At Dufour's time, the approach of an army would have been considered
provocative enough to justify an attack across the border. Second, the three
main entrances or passages through the Swiss Alps—St. Maurice, St. Gotthard,
and Sargans~are all inside one of the "forward bastions." Dufour, as an
engineer and a strategist, considered building roads in the alpine area, to
allow the movement of troops in a tactical area, with the possibility of using
by-roads. Many of the roads and passes allowing movement from one North-
South transverse to another were built according to Dufour's plan. Third,
surprisingly, Dufour did not contemplate a linear occupation along the
borders with large reserves to intervene in areas not included in the bastions,
such as the cities of Basel or Geneva. Later, in 1864, he published a study
about the defense of the western part of Switzerland,53 in which he treated
this specific problem. It was important to
...resist everywhere in case of a border violation. This is necessary to assert
our neutrality, and to reassure the population, who might otherwise think
they were being abandoned.54
A last characteristic of nineteenth century Swiss strategic thinking is the
key role of fortifications and reinforcement of the terrain. The three key
Ibid., p. 183.
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points in the Alps (St. Maurice, St. Gotthard and Sargans) have always been
fortified. Dufour developed and extended them, a process of continuous
permanent modernization, this is still under way. Beside these sites, the
tendency to reinforce almost every strong part of the Swiss territory made
itself felt. Dufour even reinforced a few cities on the northern edge of the
"great lozenge," including Aarau, Olten, and Brugg. The idea of fighting
inside these cities may appear quite modern. Yet, no consideration of civilian
casualties can be found. Should the population be evacuated in order to
escape the artillery fire from both sides? The question remained open.
C FIRST MILITARY MEASURES TAKEN IN 1856: THE
REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES
On October 16, 1856, General Dufour and Colonel Fischer, Artillery
Inspector, were commanded to go to Berne. Their mission was to plan the
detailed organization of the divisions, and to propose officers of the federal
general staff to command them. They even had to prepare staffs for non-
existent levels of command. Thus, two well-identified weaknesses were
going to find a solution. On November 5, the President of the Department of
Defense, Frey-Herosee, convened a commission to define the army's
organization. It was determined that the strength of the armed forces should
be 104,500 men, without the landwehr. Each division should be established
on the same model, with the following structure:
- 1 staff;
- 3 infantry brigades, composed of four battalions and two sniper
companies;
- 2 and a half cavalry companies;
- 3 batteries of field artillery;
- 1 logistics company;
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- 1 sapper company.
A total of nine divisions was planned, without any corps structure. On
one hand, it would allow the commander-in-chief to have direct influence on
the division level in a more efficient manner, creating a wide unity of
command and increasing mobility. On the other, it made the number of
direct subordinates relatively high, especially if one considers the importance
of formations designated as the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve was made
up of the following formations:
- 1 infantry brigade, composed of four battalions and three sniper
companies;
- 4 and a half independent infantry battalions and 21 independent
infantry companies;
- 17 sniper companies
- 3 cavalry brigades, composed of three squadrons;
- 5 artillery brigades, composed of three batteries;
- 12 fixed artillery batteries
- 3 sapper companies;
- 6 bridging companies.
With such a powerful reserve, it was possible to imagine several uses:
1. to constitute a mobile element to lead attacks on the flank or on
the rear of the enemy;
2. to reinforce engaged divisions in wide or strategically important
areas;
3. to support a main effort or to achieve surprise.
On November 17, the designated commanders were confidentially
informed about their future assignment, in order to take preliminary
measures and prepare themselves for their new task. Their final
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nominations had to take place only a few days before the mobilization;
however, in order to avoid transgressing on the authority of the federal
assembly. The designation of the commander-in-chief remained within its
competence, and it would have been unwise to force its decision.
By the same token, the general headquarters were designated for each
division: Bienne, Moutier, Liestal, Aarau, Frauenfeld, Sankt-Gallen, Chur,
Zurich, and Berne. "A territorial district was assigned to each division and
each commander had the liberty to move its brigades on its own."55 On
December 30, the federal assembly nominated General Dufour as the
commander-in-chief with 130 votes out of a total of 140, and Frey-Herosee as
the chief of staff with 118 votes.56
D. OTHER MILITARY MEASURES
On December 19, the Federal Council decided to call together the War
Council. President of this Council was Frey-Herosee, members were General
Dufour and other high-ranking officers, including Colonels Fischer
(Commander of the Artillery), Egloff (Commander of the Sixth Division),
Kurz (Commander of the Fourth Division), Veillon,57 von Salis
(Commander of the Seventh Division), Stehlin,58 Delarageaz (Engineer), and
von Linden (Commander of the Cavalry Reserve). As they were preparing
measures, the Federal Council had already taken the decision to mobilize and
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deploy two divisions along the Rhine. The third division, commanded by
Colonel Bourgeois, was deployed between Basel and the confluence of the
Aare river; the fifth division, commanded by Colonel Ziegler, had a sector
between the confluence of the Aare to Lake Constance.59
The War Council decided to reinforce Basel and Schaffhausen, in order to
protect these two vulnerable cities, and to hinder the enemy from penetrating
Swiss territory. Dufour wrote very accurate instructions to the engineer
officers: time was short, thus the fortifications had to be built in a simple way,
to quickly give sufficient protection to the soldiers, with the possibility of
developing and extending them later.
Dufour used the plan elaborated by the French engineers in 1798 to
reinforce Basel.60 The fortifications extended from the confluence of the Birs
river to the French border on the height of Klyberk. The entrenchments were
planned about 120 meters apart along an arc some three and a half kilometers
long. This way the strong points were able to support each other. A second
line of entrenchments was planned some 800 meters behind, based on natural
obstacles in order to protect the troops against artillery fire. A flood was a part
of the plan: by blocking the Wiesen river, the ground would have been
soaked to the point that the Prussian artillery and cavalry would have had
great difficulties maneuvering. However, the weather conditions would
have played a major role: ice could have compromised this idea. Additional
bridges would have to be constructed on the Rhine river in order to allow
major reinforcements to arrive or retreat into the built up area. Reserves
would have been located in the vicinity of the railroad station. For the
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defense of Basel, the deployment of 78 fixed artillery guns was planned to
support the infantry. Some 30,000 soldiers were supposed to be engaged in
the Basel area. With the protection of the fortifications, it would have meant
that the Prussian forces would have to concentrate the majority of its strength
to have a chance of defeating this defense. One should note that no cavalry
element was expected to be engaged in this area: this lack of offensive action
meant that Dufour did not intend to seek the decision there. However, to
engage almost one third of one's strength in a static defense without real
maneuver possibilities could be considered a weakness.
The reinforcement in Schaffhausen had another purpose: the intention
was to cover a possible withdrawal of troops engaged across the national
borders.61 Just one bridge crossed the Rhine in Schaffhausen at that time. To
allow possible movements, especially for light artillery, Dufour ordered the
construction of two more bridges. "No fortification should be built without a
secure way to take the gun out."62
Dufour did not intend to concentrate forces along the bank of Lake
Constance. To dominate the lake and to oppose its crossing by Prussian
forces, he ordered the six main Swiss steamers to be equipped with four naval
guns and one battery of artillery rockets apiece. The Swiss steamers were
more modern than those of the three German states across the lake. They
were able to move at greater speed. In addition, "The harbors of Romanshorn
and Rorschach were protected with high caliber artillery..."63
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Other small towns were reinforced, such as Eglisau and Rheinfelden:
their bridges were highly important. Surprisingly, some other crossing sites
were not protected, like Waldshut, considered by Colonel Bourgeois "...the
most favorable place to cross."64 The bridges, which were not planned to be
used for military purposes, were prepared for destruction: the wooden
bridges were ready to be burned, the others demolished with explosives. The
bridges needed to maneuver had to be destroyed only after the engaged
formations had returned to the southern bank of the Rhine.
To realize all the fortification works, the existing engineers' formations
had to be reinforced by civilian professionals: more than 2,000 foreigners,
who were previously engaged in railway construction, were "mobilized" and
paid on a daily rate base. The chief of the engineers branch understood that
the quality of reinforcements made by infantry or by artillery troops did not
reach the expected level of quality.
For the first time in Swiss history the telegraph was used to relay the
different division headquarters and a new line was built along the Rhine.
The general staff prepared to move troops partially by railroads, after their
mobilization, exploiting the new possibilities created by this new technology.
However, these possibilities proved to be relatively limited: in the area of
possible engagement there was just one railroad line leading from Basel over
Zurich to Lake Constance. Moreover, it was interrupted between Olten and
Baden. Considering the location of the divisions, this line could have played
a role in moving reserve elements, reinforcements, and other logistics goods.
But the results achieved were relatively poor: the transport of two battalions
in one day failed.
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The supply of the armed forces constituted a delicate problem: the Swiss
government decided to increase the autonomy in buying "2,000 barrels of
flour and 2,500 quintals of rye in America, 5,000 quintals of oats in Southern
Germany."65 This last deal demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the Prussian
measures to isolate Switzerland economically. Furthermore, bankers in
Stuttgart lent twelve million francs to the Federal Council to support the cost
of the preparation for war. With incomes of 20-21 million francs a year, it was
practically impossible to support the war effort without borrowing money.66
Part of the money was designed to buy rifles and ammunition. In the middle
of December 1856, the Confederation possessed some fifteen million
cartridges for the infantry and the cavalry.
The President of the Confederation, Stampfli, organized the first
intelligence service. The center was located in Basel and directed by the head
of the police, Bischoff . People traveling to Germany reported on preparations
there. At the end of 1856, Swiss officers led reconnaissance missions along
the Rhine and across the border. As in the other armies of the time,
however, intelligence and communications were among the weakest points.
The Federal Council gave Dufour wide authority. He was able to use
...all war material and ammunition of all cantons, to requisition
everything he thought reasonable, to put up fortifications and, if an
enemy started to move toward the border, to take the offensive without
regard to the frontier of the country. It is apparent that these instructions
gave real dictatorial powers to the general for the duration of the
campaign.67
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E. THE OPERATIONS AT THE ARMY LEVEL
At the time General Dufour was designated commander-in-chief, the two
divisions along the Rhine river had the mission of controlling the border, in
a linear disposition. In addition, the Federal Council had taken measures to
secure command and control: on December 27, the general staff and the staffs
of the first, second, fourth, sixth, and eighth divisions were mobilized. A
same measure was taken for the brigade staffs of these concerned divisions.
The main body of the "elite" formations and the army reserve were on alert,
ready to be mobilized.
Considering that the Federal Council placed great weight on preventing an
attack from South Germany, Dufour estimated that these two divisions, with
a total strength of some 14,500 men, were too weak to fulfill this task. The
sectors to be covered were too wide. He decided to deploy five divisions on
the front.68 The sixth division, commanded by Colonel Egloff, occupied the
right wing between Rohrschach and Diessenhofen. He had to organize the
landwehr from St.-Gallen in such a way that the formations would be able to
protect the harbors of Arbon and Rohrschach, and to watch the shore of the
lake. Thus, Colonel Egloff would be in a position to concentrate by Constance
and Stein. The already mobilized fifth division was newly deployed between
Diessenhofen and the mouth of the Toss river, and had to be ready "...for a
possible defense of the canton of Schaffhausen."69 The first division,
commanded by Colonel Charles Veillon, took its position between the
mouths of the Toss and Aare rivers.
See Appendix C.
69
Weiss, Gestalten und Gewalten der Schweizergeschichte, p. 152.
42
The fourth division, headed by Colonel Kurz, took over a part of the
former sector of the third division, between the mouth of the Aare river and
Rheinfelden. In this way, the third division could concentrate on the defense
of Basel.
The three new mobilized divisions were not complete: the infantry
brigades had just half of the usual strength.
It may be surprising that Dufour did not plan to mobilize the cavalry
reserve, which would have given mobility. The cavalry would have allowed
him to react to an unexpected action, to quickly reinforce a threatened area, or
to bring offensive actions against the enemy camp. Even to watch over the
border, one can assume that fewer fixed posts with decentralized mobile
reserves might have constituted a worthwhile alternative.
The Federal Council accepted the proposed disposition on January 2, 1857.
Thus, General Dufour disposed of a force of some 30,000 men.70
On this way, without spending too much money, I had a force of some
30,000 men, able to cover the border of the Rhine river, between Basel and
Constance. In very few days, we could have had more than 100,000 men, if
the enemy would have moved forward.71
Dufour decided to move the different headquarters closer to the possible
sites of action:
- first division: from Bienne to Regensberg,
- second division: from Moutier to Laufen,
- third division: from Liestal to Basel,
o
- fourth division: from Aarau to Frick,
- fifth division: from Frauenfeld to Schaffhausen,
70
See Appendix D for the detailed numbers.
71
Dufour, Campagne du Sonderbund et evenements de 1856, p. 226.
43
- sixth division: from St. Gallen to Frauenfeld,
- ninth division: from Berne to Winterthur.
The headquarters of the seventh and eighth divisions remained in Chur,
respectively Zurich.
Analyzing the sites of the second and ninth division headquarters, it
appears that the former was planned to reinforce the area of Basel and that
the latter would have been engaged to support the fifth division in
Schaffhausen. Considering the terrain, the army reserve should have been
placed in the vicinity of Zurich, as General Dufour wanted "...to vigorously
defend Basel and to attack near Schaffhausen."72 A concrete plan for the use
of the reserve was not elaborated at that time, which is somewhat surprising.
Of course, on the one hand, only the first elements were actually deployed; on
the other, the staffs should have planned how to use those elements, from
which they expected to achieve the decision.
General Dufour moved his own headquarters from Berne to Zurich on
January 14, "...to be closer to the center of the large movements I had
planned."73 On January 16, a telegraphic message informed the General that
the Federal Council had decided to release the prisoners: the possibility of a
conflict was over.
General Dufour was satisfied that "...the Swiss people had proved to the
world, that, in case of an external threat, the passions stop and men of all
political persuasions were able to hold out their hands and to gather under






sacrifices, the honor and the independence of their homeland."74 However,
he felt somewhat frustrated that the political decision taken by the federal
authorities was not really different from the proposition he made earlier
based on his discussions with Napoleon. He ordered the reinforcements of
the terrain to cease. On January 21, the non-mobilized formations stopped to
be on alert readiness. Between January 26 and February 2, the mobilized
divisions stood down. On February 2-3, General Dufour went back to Berne





V. MILITARY MEASURES TAKEN BY PRUSSIA
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The military establishment in Prussia was highly divided about the
Neuchatel affair. They understood that Frederick William IV considered this
conflict a question of honor and principle. However, the risks and costs of
such an undertaking had to be carefully evaluated. Apart from the king, the
Prussian way of thinking was realistic: the first manifestations of
"Realpolitik" occurred during this period (Otto von Bismarck was among
those involved in the political decision). For these realistic people, a military
operation should bring some clear benefit. A mere adventure should not
interest a great power.
General von der Groeben was concerned with this analysis of costs and
risks.75 How much strength would be necessary to bring a victory against the
Swiss? The Swiss strength was estimated at some 100,000 soldiers, which
could be increased to 180,000, according to Minister President von Manteuffel.
The terrain favored the defenders, who had the reputation of possessing great
skill in rifle shooting. The unity of all the Swiss population was taken into
consideration: it is always difficult to conduct an offensive action in a country
where the spirit of resistance is high. Furthermore, two different systems of
values were facing. Considering that attacking forces should have at least a
superiority of 3:1, a strength of some 300,000 should have been considered.
General von der Groeben tried to figure out what should be the size of the
attacking forces: "With 50-60,000 the attack would just be an attempt; with
100,000 a success would be possible."76 He certainly thought that the effect of
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surprise could play a major role, and that a political solution could be found
after the first battle, or even before, once a concrete threat had been made on
the Swiss border. The possibility of seizing a part of the Swiss territory to
negotiate an exchange was considered. Seizing Basel with its 30,000 defenders,
would have required the use of 100,000 men. However, no one can show that
the Swiss plan in Basel was known by the Prussian leadership. Von der
Groeben thought that the conflict could escalate into a major struggle
involving other European Great Powers. This opinion was shared by
Bunsen, the former Prussian diplomat in Bern:
An attack against Switzerland [means] a war against England and France,
and a war without allies is not possible. ...An occupation of Switzerland,
even of a single city, is a European question; the sovereignty of the Swiss
territory is a fundamental pillar of the European system.77
To face such a threat, 100,000 men should be added to the previous forces.
Thus, General von der Groeben asked fundamental questions:
How much will the engagement of 200,000 men cost? Will 60 million be
enough money? And for what purpose? Is our duty concerning
Neuchatel not exceeded by other duties?78
The possibility of internal troubles or of an unfriendly attitude of the South-
German states was not considered.
Von Manteuffel planned to invade the Swiss territories north of the
Rhine, and to press the attack only if the Swiss did not react, thus accepting
the king's legitimate requests.
On December 13, 1856 the Minister President suggested that the
mobilization should be ordered on January 1. 60 days were necessary to






to intervene if Prussia seized a part of Switzerland, he decided to follow von
Manteuffel's advice. On December 26, however, the king accepted
Napoleon's request to delay the mobilization until January 15, in order to
allow a diplomatic solution. He wanted to demonstrate his "extreme
moderation," even if he got angry with the military measures taken by
Switzerland: the news that 20,000 men were deployed on the Swiss border
had reached Berlin four days earlier.
B. PREPARATIONS FOR THE MOBILIZATION
The first reflections of the Prussian military leadership were similar to the
one of their Swiss counterpart: they were concerned about the organization
of the armed forces engaged in the operation. The chief of the general staff,
von Reyher, thought that a force of 120,000 men should be adequate to face
the estimated 106,000 Swiss soldiers of the "elite" and the army reserve. He
justified this reduced force by noting that the Swiss lacked training for larger
operations and had little discipline. The war minister agreed that eight
divisions should make the attack, but with an additional reserve. On
December 10, 1856, the final "Ordre de Bataille" was ready: four army corps,
each composed of two divisions, would compose the main body with a
strength of 116,000 men. Each corps would be supported by eleven artillery
batteries of eight guns each. This gave a total of 352 guns for the artillery,
against 600 for the Swiss. Von der Groeben estimated that the Swiss artillery
counted 200 guns,79 which demonstrates a failure of intelligence. That could
certainly have had consequences. It makes a great difference if one attacks
with a ratio of 7:12 in guns, instead of 7:4. However, the attacking force has
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greater flexibility in concentrating its guns, considering the limited mobility
of artillery batteries. A cavalry brigade should also be attributed to each corps.
Thus, instead of 10,300 horse, which would have constituted the normal
strength, the cavalry would get only 6,800 horses80 of the 32,000 that were
planned. The general staff estimated that further cavalry forces were
unsuitable in a mountainous country like Switzerland. There are reasons to
reject such an argument: the Prussians might have taken advantage of the
cavalry's flexibility against less mobile forces. To seek surprise with attacks in
depth might also have exerted an influence on the Swiss Government's
willingness to fight the war.
The reserves were designated on two levels: two regiments and one
battalion at the division level, and one division of some 30,000 men at the
army level, as the Minister of War, von Waldersee had required.
Comparing the numbers, it is amazing to consider the modest forces
Prussia was going to deploy without regard for the usual requirements
necessary to force a decision against a prepared defense. However, bare
numbers do not mean everything, as will be discussed later.
These nine divisions should have come from all the different provinces,
in order to demonstrate that every part of Prussia was concerned with the
war, even the Polish minority. At the same time, it would allow the
government to leave half of the total strength of the eight army corps in the
country to maintain order, in case of a revolution.
On October 8, 1856, Frederick William IV formally and definitively
designated General von der Groeben as the Commander-in-Chief of the






demonstrated in some way his reluctance to lead such an operation and the
frictions among the Prussian leadership. He finally accepted, under the
pressure of the king, supported by the Minister President and the Minister of
War. The king's brother, Prince William, was disappointed, at not being
given this honor. Von der Groeben selected his chief of staff, General von
Reyher, and the deputy chief of staff, von Moltke.
Major General von Waldersee made the first estimates for the cost of the
war: six million thalers would be necessary to finance the mobilization, and
three million each month of engagement should be added to the regular
budget.82
In fact, no decision to provide additional financial support was taken by
the Prussian government. The Finance Minister, like other influential
politicians, reflected public opinion in Berlin, that this affair was not really all
that serious. Yet, money constitutes the nerve of war: this lack of financial
support for the operation proves that King Frederick William was relatively
isolated in his military vision. Of course, one should consider that he would
have had the power to impose his views, if the political situation would have
evolved in another way. He could have fired the reluctant Minister and
replaced him with a successor more prepared to do as he was told.
C PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPERATION
The Prussian leadership took not only contacts on the diplomatic level:
Lieutenant Colonel von Fransecky was sent to the Grand Duchy of Baden to




Prussian approach. General von der Groeben thought that Baden should
mobilize 10,000 men, in order to: 1) secure the railroad line between Freiburg
in Breisgau and Basel; 2) cover the access to the Black Forest; 3) defend
Constance until the arrival of Prussian troops; 4) secure the line of the Rhine
river on its right bank, and protect the crossing points once the Prussian
troops had crossed.83
This approach did not get an enthusiastic welcome from the authorities of
Baden. They were extremely cautious: the fear of a French intervention, or
of a Swiss intrusion and reprisal, was real. As the decision of the Federal
Council to release the prisoners arrived in Frankfurt, a feeling of relief arose.
The rupture with Prussia had been very close.
The Prussian General Staff sent several officers to Switzerland to collect
intelligence and to conduct reconnaissance. They also concentrated
intelligence activities in Baden. Some of these officers were identified. On
the Hauenstein Pass, a man was drawing plans. One officer was arrested in
Aarau, with special maps. They especially studied the possibilities for
crossing the Rhine river. These activities were not new: they already started
in 1849, which demonstrates the king's longstanding desire to reassert his
power on Neuchatel and to fight Swiss radicalism.
The Prussian General Staff planned to move the divisions by railroad,
combined with marches. On January 5, 1857, von Waldersee sent a letter to
von Manteuffel describing the use of railroads:84
The main lines to be used were the following:
1. From Berlin and from Breslau over Dresden to Leipzig, then over
Hof, Augsburg, and Ulm to Biberach.
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2. From Berlin over Dessau, Halle, Guntershausen, Frankfurt am
Main, to Freiburg im Breisgau.
In addition, some other lines should be used as secondary ways:
a. From Magdeburg over Braunschweig, Lehrte, Hildesheim, and
Cassel to Guntershausen;
b. From Soest over Cassel to Guntershausen;
c. From Bruchsal over Stuttgart to Ulm;
d. From Mainz to Mannheim;
e. From Bamberg over Aschaffenburg to Frankfurt a.M.85
The General Staff calculated that the railroad system would have allowed
the movement of troops over distances between 60 and 220 km per day. With
an average speed of 35 km/hr, this meant that the troops had to spend
between two and seven hours on the train. The movement of some
regiments would have taken several days. To move all the planned
operation forces would have taken 35 days,86 including the technical railroad
requirements.
This plan, in theoretical terms, is highly interesting; it constitutes a kind of
precursor to the one against Austria, which brought the Prussian troops into
the battle of Koniggratz in 1866. By this occasion, the Prussian general staff
proved its ability to move even a greater amount of troops in a scientific way,
with mathematical calculations. Logistics was not forgotten by the Prussian
General Staff: several warehouses for requisitions were planned;
transportation for foodstuffs and ammunition would be used to bring the
wounded back to several improvised hospitals.
The military measures taken by Prussia seem to be adequate, even if the
ratio of forces did not conform to conventional standards. Internal tensions
and, above all, lack of international support brought Prussia to renounce the
See map by Appendix E.
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use of force. Thus, all the organizational measures could not be practically
tested.
54
VI. DUFOUR'S OPERATIONAL PLANS
A. THE OFFENSIVE BY SCHAFFHAUSEN
The Swiss political authorities and the army command shared the opinion
that Prussia was going to seize Schaffhausen, and then negotiate an exchange
for Neuchatel. Declarations by high-level Prussian personalities confirmed
their estimate of the threat. As later would be revealed, this deception
worked superbly: the Prussian planners actually worked on other
possibilities.
The Federal Council confirmed that the integrity of the Swiss territory
should be protected in its totality. Dufour, like other prominent officers,
thought that an effective defense of Schaffhausen was impossible. From a
military perspective, there were two alternatives: to concentrate the defense
on the southern bank of the Rhine river, or to cross the border in order to
seek more suitable positions in Baden.
One can argue that a defense of Schaffhausen should have been studied
more closely: several plans to defend this isolated canton had been made in
modern times, without encroaching upon German territory.
Dufour thought that he did not have to care about other states of the
German Confederation: if they were prepared to tolerate the use of their
territories for Prussian movements and preparations, they could be
considered potential enemies. Dufour was confident of his plans for the
energetic defense in Basel, and believed that if the Prussian army "...were to
cross the Rhine, they would be playing our game, because we would fight
from our positions."87
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Thus, Dufour planned to conduct "...an offensive in the area of
Schaffhausen, and a strong defense in Basel."88 He would engage the main
body, a strength of 50,000 men, in the Schaffhausen area, with 30,000 men to
defend Basel, and one division to occupy Chur and the Luziensteig, in order
to prevent possible Austrian action. The reserve of some 12-14,000 men was
to be concentrated in the vicinity of Zurich, and kept ready to intervene to
reinforce the most threatened body.89
Believing that an offensive to the Black Forest was too risky, Dufour
decided to occupy positions in the hills controlling the Aach and the Wutach
rivers. The five divisions engaged in this operation would pursue the
following course of action:90
On the first day:
1. The first division would cross the Rhine in Eglisau and
Kaiserstuhl.
2. The sixth division, coming from Stein, would seize the
Schiernerberg and Gailingen. In front of the Diessenhofen Bridge,
the engineer's corps would build a bridgehead.
3. The fifth division, which already was in Schaffhausen, would
send one brigade on the road of Donaueschingen, another in the
direction of Engen, the third one remaining in Schaffhausen.91
4. The ninth division would move forward over Andelfingen, in
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On the second day:
1. The first division would continue its movement to occupy the
position on the Wutach river.
2. The sixth division would take up a position on the eastern part
of the Aach river, between Singen and its mouth into the lake.
3. The fifth division would engage two brigades close to Engen and
the third one would occupy Blumenfeld.
4. The ninth division would cross the Rhine river and occupy the
position on the Aach river, between the sixth and fifth divisions.
5. The eighth division, coming from Zurich, would arrive in
Schaffhausen. 92
On the third day:
1. The eighth division would continue to the vicinity of Thaingen,
in the rear of the first line.
Dufour, conscious that the soldiers were going to encounter difficulties
bivouacking in the snow, "...nevertheless felt sure that the patriotism of our
soldiers will make them patiently endure this hard trial."93 From the
beginning, he planned to leave the heavy luggage on the left side of the
Rhine. This meant that General Dufour did not have the intention to press
further than the Aach-Wutach line and that he did not plan to fight the
"decisive" battle in Schaffhausen, as will be discussed later.
In fact, Dufour's offensive plan is a defense on foreign territory using
favorable terrain features. Dufour possessed a certain freedom of maneuver
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with the eighth division, which could be considered a reserve of first echelon,
to buy time to allow the Army Reserve to arrive from Zurich.
One might be surprised that Dufour presented his intention in terms of
positioning troops, instead of describing the military actions he wanted his
divisions to do. Directly describing how he wanted to engage the brigades, he
did not leave much initiative to the division commanders. However, his
plan respected some essential principles in the conduct of war: concentration,
liberty of maneuver, initiative and simplicity were the main characteristics.
In his book Campagne du Sonderbund et evenements de 1856, General
Dufour explained that he was going to "hold firmly and give up terrain only a
foot at a time." He did not plan further offensive actions, but a withdrawal in
the case of a "superior adversary." He imagines this action as following:
1. The eighth division should occupy the heights surrounding
Schaffhausen; if the reserve would have arrived, this would be its
mission. In such a case, the eighth division would defend south of
the Rhine river.
2. The sixth division would cross the river by Stein, Diessenhofen
and Biisingen. The three bridges would then be destroyed.
3. The ninth division would follow the eighth and cross the Rhine
on pontoon bridges, which would then be removed.
4. The fifth division would cross the river by Schaffhausen and
Rheinau.
5. The reserve, or the eighth division, would fight as long as
possible, then take the artillery from the fortifications in order to
bring it to the southern bank, or, if necessary, to throw it into the
river. Then this rear guard would march its way back over
Schaffhausen, under fire protection of the elements already
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occupying defensive positions on the opposite side.94
In a next step, landwehr formations and volunteers would be in charge of
the defense of the Rhine, allowing the main body to be engaged in another
deployment. One could imagine that the main body could occupy what
Dufour called the "great lozenge."95
Dufour clearly recognized that "...many events could have brought trouble
in such a withdrawal."96 Dufour's withdrawal plan was intended to cost
heavy losses to the Prussian troops: he planned to counterattack as soon as an
enemy weakness would have appeared.
Dufour did not give orders to prepare the execution of this plan. The only
practical measures he took consisted of reconnaissance along the Aach and
Wutach rivers, by the commanders of the first, fifth and sixth divisions. He
also wrote regulations about the behavior to adopt with the inhabitants of
occupied areas. Thus, this plan has to be considered as the result of
preliminary thinking about a possible course of action.
This plan is of great historical interest to the Swiss armed forces. It
constitutes the last plan to preemptively engage ground forces in such large
numbers beyond the Swiss border. In modern times, much smaller actions
have been planned, seldom with a strength exceeding a reinforced tank
brigade, and always in a reactive way. The enemy had to cross the borders
first, clearly demonstrating that he did not respect Switzerland's neutrality.
After 1857, to move or concentrate troops on the Swiss border has ceased to be
a sufficient reason to justify a preventive attack.
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See map by Appendix I.
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See map by Appendix A.
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Dufour, Campagne du Sonderbund et evenements de 1856, p. 237.
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B. DUFOUR'S OPERATIONAL PLAN IN THE EVENT OF A PRUSSIAN
ATTACK OVER SACKINGEN TOWARD BERNE
Some years after the events of 1856-57, Dufour wrote in his memoirs that
he would not have crossed the Rhine river when facing 140,000 men. No one
can make such a judgment about unrealized intentions. One supposes that
Dufour made this statement after having heard from a high-ranking Prussian
officer that they had planned to cross the Rhine by Sackingen and were going
to lead the main attack in the direction of Berne. Dufour elaborated a plan to
face this threat. As the plan was made some years after the event, however,
few historians have been interested in it,97 or have noticed its existence.
Reflecting Dufour's military thinking, this plan can be considered another
possible course of action, and as such is of some interest.
Dufour estimated that the Prussian troops would have needed much
more than two days to reach the heart of his defense. All the bridges between
Basel and Waldshut would have been destroyed. One division was already
engaged in front of the enemy in Sackingen. In addition to these elements,
the crossing of the Aare river, which constitutes a real obstacle, would have
taken further considerable time. Within these two days, Dufour would have
had the time to move three divisions from the eastern part of Switzerland to
the threatened area. Of course, after two days, even an improvised defense
would have improved the defensive position by reinforcing the terrain.
Comparing the first plan of action after the mobilization98 with the new
plan,99 it appears that two divisions, the third and the fourth, were already
97
Roland Beck revealed this plan for the first time in his publication Roulez tambours.
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See map by Appendix C.
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occupying favorable positions and did not need to undertake significant
moves. The second division, previously intended to support the division
defending Basel, would have gotten practically the same area, but with
another front. As this division was not mobilized, there were no practical
consequences. The second division in Laufen should support not only the
fourth, in Fricktal, but also the first, on the heights of the Bozberg, a key
terrain feature in this area. This division would have prevented the enemy
from seizing Brugg and its important bridges on the Aare river. Further,
Dufour planned to engage three divisions (eighth, ninth, and sixth) on the
Aare river. They had to defend it in such a way that no enemy force would
have been able to cross. At the same time, they were supposed to be ready to
reinforce or to support the divisions engaged at the front. The Army Reserve
would then have reinforced the division, which would have given them
forces.
Dufour imagined two means of attacking the enemy in the flank and
cutting his lines of communication:
1. If the seventh division was not threatened, it would have had to
join the fifth in Schaffhausen, then follow the left bank of the
Rhine to Waldshut, and from there push forward on both banks to
Basel, cleaning up the enemy.
2. If this action could not take place, the fifth division in Basel
would have had to destroy its heavy guns, burn the bridges and
attack on Badenese territory in the direction of Schaffhausen.
A combination of these two variants was not planned, which seems to be
reasonable. A convergent attack coming from two opposite sides is a difficult
maneuver: coordination of fire brings such great problems that losses from
friendly fire are almost unavoidable.
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Dufour's plan presents interesting characteristics. The concentration of
divisions and optimal use of the terrain are positive points. The idea of
directing offensive actions along the Rhine river demonstrates Dufour's
willingness to fight aggressively. A good defense always has to be combined
with attacks, in order to exploit the adversary's weaknesses and to seek the
decision. The terrain on both sides of the Rhine, however, is not especially
easy: narrow places alternate with wider ones. A real deployment can be
achieved for no more than one to three kilometers at a time. Then a
constriction obligates the attacking formation to concentrate practically on a
single road. The narrow passages are not simultaneously found on both
sides, but the river cannot be crossed, physically separating the two forces as
they progress: the only support they are able to provide to each other is fire in
a limited way, because of the relatively dense vegetation. The hills
dominating both sides offer good opportunities to direct attacks against the
flank. One may imagine that, after a first contact, the Prussian reserve would
hold back on the northern bank to counter-attack in the flank of the
progressing Swiss forces. Dufour himself recognized that such a plan would
not have been easy to realize.
The engagement of the reserve can be considered as a weakness. It is
difficult to understand why forces coming from the three divisions deployed
on the Aare river to provide reinforcement to the front formations, should
themselves be reinforced by elements of the Army Reserve. One could
logically consider directly engaging this reserve to support the front divisions,
avoiding additional new subordinations and simplifying the movements.
An adequate solution to engage the reserve would have consisted of
preparing it north of the Aare to attack the flank of the enemy once it became
involved in combat with a front division. Thus, the initiative could have
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been taken on two different levels: first, on the strategic level along the
Rhine river, second, on the tactical one, directly supporting an engaged
division.
It is interesting to notice that Dufour was applying Jomini's principles:
"...one of the greatest talents of a general consists of knowing when to use in
turn the two systems [defensive and offensive], and especially to know when
to seize the initiative, even in the middle of a defensive fight."100
Antoine-Henri Jomini, Precis de I'art de la guerre I. Paris: Anselin, 1838, p. 168.
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VII. PRUSSIA'S OPERATIONAL PLANS
Three different personalities developed operational plans to attack
Switzerland. Prince Frederick Charles, at this time a twenty-eight year old
Lieutenant General, presented a study that one could consider a step in the
progress of his education as a general staff officer. 101 In contrast, cavalry
General Charles Frederick William von Reyher, chief of the great general
staff, presented a genuinely feasible course of action, as did cavalry General
Charles von der Groeben, commander of the guard corps. No one can tell
which plan would have been selected. However, one point is certain: the
king himself would have made the decision.
A. PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES' OPERATIONAL PLAN
Prince Frederick Charles' study is characterized by the dominance of
politics over rigid military principles. He wanted to maximize flexibility in
order to offer a political solution to the Swiss. Thus, he imagined a gradually
increasing attack with breaks between the different phases to allow possible
negotiations. For him, the key point remained the imposition of the king's
decision to restore his rights over the Principality of Neuchatel. The
gradually seized parts of Switzerland would play the role of a money
exchange. He first planned to invade Swiss territory north of the Rhine. If
the Federal Council did not react positively, Prince Frederick Charles
envisaged pursuing the offensive to seize the eastern part of Switzerland
(northeast of the line formed by the Limmat river and the lakes of Zurich and
Walenstadt), eventually the Jura Mountains area, including the Principality
Mentioned by Otto Weiss in Gestalten und Gewalten der Schweizergeschichte, p. 170.
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of Neuchatel. If the Swiss would not negotiate within 24 hours, he would
continue the attack in the direction of Geneva, Berne, and Lucerne, which
meant in practice the occupation of the most important part of the country—
the cities.
The idea of seizing the eastern part of Switzerland is noteworthy: the right
flank can be easily defended based on strong natural obstacles, while Zurich
constitutes a valuable political objective, located close to the border, without
any major obstacle once the Rhine is crossed at Eglisau. In addition to these
elements, the expeditionary force would have allied states in its back, with
good lines of communication. The only weakness lies in the crossing sites of
the Rhine river, which would cost significant forces to secure. In contrast, an
action through the Jura Mountains presents incredible difficulties, and would
offer to the Swiss favorable possibilities of defense with relatively few forces.
In the Jura area, which is a poor part of the country with few inhabitants, the
only interesting objective to be found is the city of Basel, the richest locality of
Switzerland at the time. One might well be surprised that the prince did not
limit his goal to Basel, the key objective of this area. Perhaps the
psychological impact of seizing the "beloved Principality" played a major role
in his thinking. As previously mentioned, the seizure of Basel would not
have been an easy task. Prince Frederick Charles completely underestimated
the strength of Swiss forces engaged in the defense of Basel. 102 However,
disliking the fact that the right flank of the attacking forces would have to
follow the French border, and realizing the low feasibility of this operation
through the Jura Mountains, he renounced this option. He concentrated his
study on the attack in the eastern part of Switzerland, developing two
102
Roland Beck, in Roulez tambours, p. 108, mentions that the Prince estimated that 8,000 men
would be engaged in Basel, instead of the 30,000 planned by General Dufour.
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variants. 103 The first option (A) would have led the main body to attack
between the mouth of the Aare river and the Rafzerfeld. He planned to cross
the Rhine with pontoon bridges, allowing 30,000 men to be on Swiss territory
within nine to twelve hours. The second option (B) intended the main body
to attack by Constance. He quickly renounced this second variant, which was
much too dangerous: the terrain did not allow a real deployment. The only
role assigned to Constance would have been to fix the Swiss formations in
this area, which in fact does not lead to any decision. Thus, Prince Frederick
Charles' definitive operational plan foresaw, as the second step, an attack
over the Rhine. 104 Facing the first Swiss division, the crossing operation
would have been risky and the casualties probably high. In addition, the
Federal Reserve, located near Zurich, could have been engaged in a very short
time. The main problem General Dufour would have had to face would
have been to reconstitute a new reserve and to re-concentrate forces, which
seemed to have been a realistic possibility. No one could predict the result of
the struggle, if this variant would have been applied. It is interesting to note
that Prince Frederick Charles' plan did not please the Generals von der
Groeben and von Reyher. They did not criticize the risks taken by the
crossing operation. They did not appreciate the different breaks in the action.
For them, political considerations should not reduce the liberty of maneuver
of the commanding general, who should be free to exploit eventual enemy
weaknesses. Once an attack was underway, the momentum should not be
interrupted. Von Reyher mentioned105 that Napoleon I did not use political
103
See map by Appendix K.
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objectives. The enemy armed forces had to be defeated, pursued, and
destroyed. Then the negotiations could take place. It is effectively strange for
a military leader not to concentrate on the defeat of the opposed armed forces.
However, one should note that Prince Frederick Charles prepared his study in
the first half of December 1856. At that time, the Swiss authorities had not
ordered a mobilization and the population had not demonstrated its "warlike
spirit." Thus, Prince Frederick Charles overestimated the pressure that the
mere presence of the Prussian army could have exerted on the Swiss
authorities.
B. GENERAL VON REYHER'S OPERATIONAL PLAN
In fact, General von Reyher's ideas might be more accurately described as a
scheme of maneuver, rather than an operational plan: no detailed study has
been found. In the specialized literature, this plan is always evoked in
relatively vague terms. The general intention of General von Reyher
consisted of crossing the Rhine river between Basel and Sackingen, to
eventually seize Basel or just bypass it, and to lead the main attack to Berne,
the strategic objective. 106
The idea of defining a clear strategic goal is interesting: with the seizure of
the enemy's capital and possibly the country's government, the possibilities
of Swiss resistance would have been greatly reduced. General von Reyher
seems to seek a political center of gravity, in the Clausewitzian sense.
General von der Groeben accepted Berne as a final objective. However, he
criticized the fact that two major obstacles, the Rhine and the Aare rivers, had
to be crossed. 107 Prussian engineers confirmed that the crossing of the Aare
See map by Appendix M.
From von der Groeben's memoirs cited by Edgar Bonjour in Der Nenenberger Konflikt
1856/57, p. 176.
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river at Olten was a very delicate technical task. In addition, if the engineers'
corps had to build bridges under Swiss fire, it could have definitively
compromised the success of such an operation. The fact that the main body of
the attacking forces, coming from Stockach, had to move through the Black
Forest, brought another risk. 108 The Prussians believed that the Swiss were
able to employ snipers in the Black Forest area, and to lead ambushes in a
kind of guerrilla warfare. No trace of this original idea is to be found in the
Swiss documents and literature of the time. 109
Frederick William IV accepted the plan, however, with fundamental
modifications: "...simultaneously with this main operation [against Berne], to
move with detached corps against Neuchatel and Lucerne on the other
hand." 110 This splitting of forces is not very convincing, considering the
military principle of concentration, and probably would not have brought
more benefit than the seizure of Berne.
According to General von der Groeben, von Reyher accepted the
argument about the difficulty of crossing the Aare, and gave up the further
elaboration of his plan.
108
Possible Swiss reaction to von Reyher's plan is described in chapter 6.
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One should note that the idea of conducting guerrilla warfare beyond the border was taken
into consideration in the twentieth century by different Swiss military leaders.
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C GENERAL VON DER GROEBEN'S OPERATIONAL PLAN
General von der Groeben began planning an operation against
Switzerland as early as November 18, 1856, after having received a
preliminary intention from the king of Prussia: "To seize Basel and
Schaffhausen with the speed of a storm." And if the prisoners were not
liberated and Neuchatel not placed under protection of the Great Powers
within twenty-four hours, "...to march with 50,000 men against Berne and
with 10,000 against Neuchatel."111 This unconventional formulation,
specifying the precise strengths to be deployed, but without any supporting
analysis, sounds strange. However, it was sufficient to initiate serious
reflections. General von der Groeben put a lot of value on secrecy:
I did not trust anybody [to let him know] my real intention. Even not
Reyher. Once revealed, no secret can be maintained until the action's
execution. And an unexpected military plan means half of the victory.112
He even remained on a very general plane when three of the commanding
generals, von Werder, von Wussow and von Bonin asked him about his
projects on January 3, 1857. He kept the same line even with Minister
President von Manteuffel. Effectively, no one was informed: surprise,
whatever its effect, would have been preserved.
On January 11, 1857, after having gotten the results of an engineer
reconnaissance on the possibilities of crossing the Rhine at Kadelburg, he
prepared an Army order, which did not differ from the previous plan. For
him, it was important to seize sensitive strategic objectives, but also to defeat
in
Beck, Roulez tambours, p. 112.
112
From von der Groeben's memoirs, cited by Edgar Bonjour in Der Neuenberger Konflikt
1856/57, p.181.
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the Swiss armed forces: this latter point makes the great difference with
Prince Frederick Charles' operational plan.
General von der Groeben planned to use
...both railroad lines, over Leipzig and Augsburg to Stockach and over
Erfurt, Frankfurt am Main, to Freiburg. On each, two corps should move
and the operation should start on the communication line Freiburg-
Stockach. 113
The key idea was to attack first on both flanks, in order to divert Swiss forces
on these actions, and then to lead the main attack between these two areas.114
Thus, the fourth corps should attack Schaffhausen from the rear, in
combination with an operation against Constance, with the support of the
"reduced Constance fleet." The difficulties of crossing the Rhine river by
Kaisersaugst or Rheinfelden, and by Stein am Rhein for the other wing are
not specifically mentioned in von der Groeben's memoirs. However, it did
not represent an easy task. He was aware that Constance was evacuated by the
Badenese troops, and that the Swiss could have preventively occupied this
city. However, this action served no other purpose than creating a diversion.
With the main body, the first and second corps, he planned to cross the
Rhine at Kadelburg, a favorable site to anchor the bridges, but with few
possibilities for deployment and poor means of communication. Once the
Rhine river was crossed, he would pursue the attack simultaneously with




See map by Appendix N.
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He probably considered engaging parts of the third and fourth corps in this attack, which
could represent the strength of a corps. It would make little sense to leave Basel, Schaffhausen
and Zurich without any occupation force.
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push "...to the lake of Geneva, if Neuchatel was not seized by the attack."116
He also planned to keep
...strong reserves by the Rhine river, in order to encounter enemy actions
against his flanks or rear. Strong bridgeheads on the Rhine river. 117
In addition to the secrecy that surrounded it, this plan presents several
positive aspects, especially in comparison with the one of Prince William
Charles and General von Reyher. First, the attack would have been initiated
on a wide front of some eighty kilometers. The crossing of a river such as the
Rhine, especially in March, constitutes a tough task and one should consider
it a mistake to concentrate on one or few crossing sites. The concentration
had to occur later, to face the main body of the enemy's forces. This wide
deployment required more crossing material and engineers formations than
the other solutions would have. Would the Prussian troops have had
enough material to pursue the operation, especially on the south bank of the
Aare? This important question remains open. Another positive point of this
plan is the deliberate attack along both banks of the Aare, which would have
allowed a surprise attack against the enemy flank, at least for the first engaged
divisions. The concentration of troops was effective, even allowing for a
"strong reserve" and "strong bridgeheads," the division of occupation forces
in the main cities, and the inevitable casualties. The strategic goals were
clearly defined. Undeniably, this plan was superior to the other two
alternatives. However, in addition to the unavoidable Rhine river crossing
operation, it possessed a major weakness, having to do with the action along
116






the Aare. The right wing, on the northern bank of the river, would have had
severe difficulties deploying. In fact, the two corps, or more realistically, the
reinforced corps, could just have progressed in columns with an exposed
right flank and fragile lines of communication: the Jura Mountains which
border the river present favorable possibilities for leading ambushes and
other guerrilla-like actions. In addition, several localities present obstacles
between the mountains and the river: a defense with relatively few forces
could have been very effective. The left wing would have faced similar
problems, in fact minor ones, in comparison with the consecutive river
crossing operations to mount. The main characteristics of the terrain between
Zurich and Berne is that all the rivers coming from the Alps flow into the
Aare river. Eleven such rivers are running perpendicularly to the Aare and
constitute, for the main part of them, serious obstacles, especially during the
spring season. To achieve such a push on the southern bank with destroyed
bridges would have cost incredible time, material, and strength. Under
fighting conditions, this approach appears to be at least risky, and ultimately
not feasible. General von der Groeben hardly criticized the two alternate
plans. He might well have been more critical of his own: success was far
from guaranteed. Even with good maps, he did not completely take the
strength of the terrain into account, which could have been a decisive trump
in the Swiss hands.
Dufour's decision to mobilize and deploy five divisions along the Rhine
seems to suggest the outcome of at least the first phase of the battle. What
could have happened later is pure speculation: among the available
literature, no mention is made that General Dufour ever knew anything
about von der Groeben' s plan. Thus, no later reconsiderations are available,




The struggle between Switzerland and Prussia ended without direct
military confrontation. Thus, it is impossible to predict what the outcome
would have been, given the different alternative plans: one is simply able to
compare them to emphasize strong points and weaknesses. These plans are
in fact general ideas of maneuver, with such wide possibilities for outcome
and so many imponderables, that even a comparison must be treated with
caution.
One specific point should be considered: the question of the ratios.
Numbers of soldiers and guns can be compared. It is surprising how modest
were the forces Prussia planned to engage: at that time, an attacking force was
supposed to possess a superiority of three to one. This was not the case, or
only locally, if the forces were concentrated on a narrow front. Only General
von der Groeben's plan offered the space for reasonable deployments, but at
the cost of insufficient concentration.
Numbers, of course, are not everything. According to Paul Kennedy, "In
any case, numbers are not as important as morale and training, sophistication
of equipment and capacity to project force to distant theaters."118 Alvin and
Heidi Toffler emphasize: "...seizing the initiative, better intelligence and
communication, and better trained soldiers, more strongly motivated, all
count for more than sheer numbers..."119 In addition, one should consider
the ability of the leaders, and the role of the geographic conditions, such as the
terrain and the population.
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The morale of the Swiss Army would presumably have been better than
that of the Prussians: the Swiss soldiers were defending their country, homes
and families against an invader. This factor of motivation should have been
determining, more than the fact that they were defending democratic values
and principles. With respect to training, one must differentiate among the
various levels: on a fundamental level, both armies were well trained; on a
more detailed level, the Prussian Army certainly had an advantage—corps and
division staffs were trained and were used to engaging large forces, which was
not the case for the Swiss. The Prussian Army had another small advantage
in the area of equipment: all of its soldiers were armed with modern rifles,
while the Swiss were partially equipped with older weapons. However, they
were known and respected as fearsome gunmen, even by the Prussian
generals. 120 With the exception of this question of rifles for parts of the Swiss
Army, the equipment can be considered as equivalent in quality.
The attacking force, in this case the Prussians, possesses the initiative, by
definition. However, General Dufour's doctrine was not built on pure
defense: he always planned aggressive actions in order to force the decision, a
"combined defense," conceptually similar to Jomini's ideas. General
Dufour's military education clearly determined his taste for the offense: he
knew perfectly the Napoleonic principle that "...it is already a big mistake to
allow the others to attack you."121
In the domain of intelligence and communication, the advantage can be
given to Switzerland: it is always easier to collect information in one's own
country, while a supporting population and the telegraph lines favored the
120
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defenders. However, as mentioned earlier, intelligence and communication
of the time were relatively poor, so that all the European countries tended
toward the same weakness.
At the highest level of comparison, the leaders of both sides were
outstanding personalities, with extensive military knowledge and clear ideas.
However, General Dufour was a European authority in the matter of tactics,
engineering and topography. His detailed knowledge of the terrain would
probably have been a great advantage. He also possessed extended authority—
a real "dictatorship "--and the Federal Council would not have interfered in
the conduct of operations. General von der Groeben would possibly not have
been in such a favorable position, with King Frederick William IV watching
over his shoulder: interference on the part of the king would have been
likely, considering the king's personality and somewhat chaotic approach.
The geographic conditions present clear advantage for Switzerland: the
Prussians would have had to face simultaneously difficult terrain features
and a hostile population, in addition to possible negative reactions of other
Great Powers and "revolutionary" movements.
Even in comparing these different elements, it remains impossible to
establish any prognosis about the military outcome. The only certainty is that
a military confrontation would have cost many casualties, suffering and
money for both sides, just for a matter of "principle and honor."
This period of European history is relatively unknown and presents a
major interest. Through the struggle between Prussia and Switzerland, one
can observe that the Concert of Europe was no longer working as it did in
1815 and immediately afterwards. Increasing tensions and rivalries among
the Great Powers were characteristic of the period. It is especially interesting
to note the perceptible tension between Austria-Hungary and Prussia, in
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search of a hegemonic role in the German-speaking area. One sees here the
first inkling of the future conflict between them.
Switzerland, located in the heart of Europe, played a relatively peaceful
role, not threatening its neighbors, not having the smallest spirit of conquest.
This attitude probably contributed to calming the crisis.
On the internal level, Prussia celebrated the liberation of the political
prisoners as a victory, which in fact did not bring real consequences: the
stakes were not so important for Prussia, if analyzed dispassionately.
Conversely, the consequences were fundamental for Switzerland. The
country, facing a common threat, regained its unity which had been
fragmented some ten years earlier, during the Sonderbund War (1847). This
unity and the display of nationalism and patriotism, impressed the Great
Powers and certainly contributed to the continued respect of Switzerland's
neutrality in the future.
On the military level, all the lessons were not drawn: General Dufour
noted the necessity of training the troops more frequently, and of engaging
them in large-scale exercises, which he called the "prises d'armes." It would
take many years before the political authorities decided to raise several
divisions simultaneously for the purpose of maneuvers. Another war
between two neighboring countries would be necessary to lead to the major
military reforms of the 1870s.
Finally, General Dufour's visions proved, once more, to have been right.
However, this fact does not hold the same importance as the fact that
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C. Map: First Operational Plan
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Appendix B: Plan for the reinforcement of Basel
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Appendix D: Strength of Swiss Armed Forces Mobilized in January 1857












Seventh Division not mobilized
Eighth Division 20
Ninth Division not mobilized
Artillery Reserve not mobilized
Cavalry Reserve not mobilized
Infantry Reserve not mobilized
Total: 29,449
Source: Guillaume-Henri Dufour, Verzeichniss der verschiedenen Stabe der
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